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"Privacy is a term with many meanings".[1]
"The simple word 'privacy' has taken on so many different meanings in so many
different corners of the law that it has largely ceased to convey any single coherent
concept".[2]
The functions of a general commitment to the value of privacy as a part of the law
are varied, and cannot be reduced to the amount of protection actually given to that
value in the legal system … the commitment to privacy is no different than the
commitment to other values, such as freedom of expression or liberty.[3]
{1}In cyberspace, as in today's real world, there seems to be confusion in regard to what privacy[4] is and
what it is not. One scholar, Ruth Granson highlights recent efforts to fully comprehend privacy: "the concept
of privacy is a central one in most discussions of modern Western life, yet only recently have there been
serious efforts to analyze just what is meant by privacy."[5] Over the years, the conception of the nature and
extent of privacy has been severely bent out of shape. The definitions and concepts of privacy are as varied as
those in the legal and academic circles who explore privacy. Another scholar, Judith DeCew, examines the
diversity of privacy conceptions: "the idea of privacy [which is] employed [by various legal scholars], is not
always the same. Privacy may refer to the separation of spheres of activity, limits on governmental authority,
forbidden knowledge and experience, limited access, and ideas of group membership…[c]onsequently …
privacy is commonly taken to incorporate different clusters of interest."[6]
{2}At one time, privacy implied that individuals could be secluded, but that has radically changed. Logistical
barriers created by geography once protected a person. This too, though, has radically changed. The
geographical wall of protection, which incidentally was not created by our legal system, has been removed by
the development of the Internet, and more recently, by the World Wide Web. The loss of these once
formidable barriers has not been accounted for in the scholarship available today.
{3}For today, "effective protection of personal data and privacy is developing into an essential precondition
for social acceptance of the new digital networks and services." [7] Privacy can no longer be assumed, even
in the security of one's own home. Instead, privacy is a condition that is much easier to violate, and thus, is
much more difficult to establish and protect.
{4}The way in which we continue to view privacy has not significantly changed across time, and in some
cases, change has been actively resisted. Yet somehow, privacy has evolved from a small single-function
business into a complex conglomerate. A basic paradigm shift in the way we conceptualize privacy is in
order. For at this instance, "privacy" should be viewed as a foundational concept in the same manner that life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are foundational concepts in our society. In order to begin to accomplish
this paradigm shift, it is first necessary to revisit the cultural evolution of "privacy," so that we can fully
analyze the ramifications and impact of emerging technologies.
 
II. PRIVACY REMOLDED BY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
 
A. New Issues Raised by Technology
{5}Uses of new technologies raise policy issues that are often defined in terms of invasion of privacy. [8]
Supporting this contention, one commentator, Patricia Mell, notes that the use of computers to manage
information has considerably blurred the demarcation between public and private realms. [9] Unfortunately,
this blurring of the realms of privacy by the influx of technological advances only adds to the problem we are
now striving to address. This contention also supports a similar, and ever - present condition, which Arthur
Miller noted in 1971, by stating that, "[it] is essential to expose the ways computer technology is magnifying
the threat to informational privacy - a threat that we have faced in some form ever since man began to take
notes about himself and his neighbors;"[10] and which have also been supported by the 1978 and 1993 Louis
Harris polls.[11] Yet, another legal scholar, Henry Perritt observes: "in the long run, adoption of information
technologies will blur the boundaries between citizen and agency and between agency and court. Blurring of
these boundaries may necessitate rethinking the definitions of some of the basic events that define the
administrative process, public participation, and judicial review."[12]
{6}Finally, noted constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe recommends, "that policy makers look not at what
technology makes possible, but at the core values the Constitution enshrines."[13] Principles, such as those
that underlie privacy, must be "invariab[le] … despite accidents of technology."[14] Thus, an irony now
presents itself: the very technology that simplifies our lives simultaneously complicates our legal analysis of
this most fundamental of concepts.
B. The Concept of Privacy Evolves
{7}The primary reason for current concern appears to be directly related to the changing nature and
magnitude of threats to privacy. This is due, in large part, to technology. The legal provisions of the past can
simply no longer protect an acceptable level of privacy. Technological advances have made it either
impossible or extremely costly for individuals to achieve the level of privacy that was once enjoyed. Thus, it
now seems appropriate to revisit even the most basic and fundamental underpinnings of privacy. In order to
gain an appreciation of the law regarding privacy, it is appropriate to ask first what privacy is, and then, to
proceed to question the extent to which the law protects it. This two-prong method of analysis "raises
questions as to why people want privacy, why it is that although they want it, they do not make claims for
legal protection, and, if they do, why the law is reluctant to respond." [15] Through answering these
questions, we are provided with a greater "understanding of the scope of actual legal protection and the way
the law reflects social needs, the limits of the law in protecting human aspirations, and the need for further
legal protection created by changes in social and technological conditions." [16] Thus, the inquiry evolves
into a multi-faceted exploration that crosses many disciplines, such as sociology, law, psychology, and most
recently, technology.
{8}It is also helpful to identify those aspects of human life that would be impossible - or highly unlikely -
without some form of privacy. For instance, our health, both physical and mental, our religion, and many
similar lifestyle decisions necessitate the affordance of some elements of privacy. Additionally, one cannot
begin to explore privacy by investigating existing laws and court decisions without possessing a well-founded
concept of privacy itself beforehand. For this reason, an exploration of the basic nature of privacy, what
privacy is, what privacy is not, and its functions will assist in developing an understanding of privacy in our
electronic society. This understanding will then enable an improved comprehension of what is theoretically
and practically needed to assist the evolution of the current concept of privacy in today's society.
{9}It was not until the latter Nineteenth Century that legal thinkers began to first conceive of the notion of
privacy as a legal right. [17] The emergence of a newly-industrialized society required a greater quantity and
quality of information than did pre-industrial society. [18] The U.S. labor force was migrating toward urban
centers where industry was burgeoning.[19] The aggregation of so many people into condensed areas greatly
facilitated compiling information. [20] This fostered a greater reliance on newly-developed machines, by
which to boost the process of information gathering. [21] An "individual's ability to shield information about
himself from the public was beginning to erode in response to society's increased need for more information."
[22] This erosion became more pronounced when, in 1876, the telephone was invented, followed closely by
the invention of the radio. [23] At that time, there was an increasing ability of information technology to
pervasively intrude upon privacy. [24] As a result of this intrusion, the framework was laid for "first modern
cases of government surveillance." [25]
{10}The moment was at hand for someone to step forward and to postulate a new legal paradigm. Justices
Warren and Brandeis did just that when they crafted a notion of privacy that spoke of personality and
character. These scholars built upon the work of Judge Thomas Cooley, who, in his famous treatise on torts
that was published in 1879, spoke of the right "to be let alone" as matter of personal security. [26] The
concept of privacy that Warren and Brandeis put forth in their landmark law review article was supported by
a many legal thinkers of the time. Indeed, in their often cited article, "Warren and Brandeis attempted to carve
out an interest - viewed by some as a 'personality interest' and by others in more proprietary terms - without
concomitantly attempting a clear description of that interest." [27]
{11}In their search for privacy in the form of solitude, Nineteenth Century Americans invented barbed wire
and proceeded to build fences along the frontier. [28] Similarly, the private Pullman compartment was
invented when railroads became the rage. As a result of these processes, Americans have evolved a deep-
rooted concern for privacy, and have since continually sought to satisfy their desire to "be let alone." [29]
{12}New developments in Nineteenth Century technology and business methods require that the next steps
be taken to protect the right "to be let alone." [30] Warren and Brandeis' argument posited that, while some
aspects of privacy involve the ownership or possession of real property, we also need to protect human
'personality.' [31] These forward-thinking legal scholars wanted to extend the scope of the law to include a
person's feelings and emotions in its coverage. [32]
{13}However, the law of the land in 1928 did not yet recognize that the right to privacy included a person's
character. In 1967, the Supreme Court first intervened in this area in Katz v. United States. [33] In Katz, the
Court ruled that a wiretap was an invasion of privacy. Following the Katz decision, the Congress, in 1968,
supported by the Court's Berger v. New York [34], established a framework to allow electronic wiretapping
only under the most limited circumstances. Congress made it clear that wiretapping was to be considered
only as a last resort. [35] The Supreme Court spoke to the constitutional right of privacy that protected
citizens from governmental officials. Over the years this right was expanded to protect the autonomy of the
individual to make certain important decisions of a very personal nature in such matters as marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. [36]
In the 1970's, the U.S. emerged as a world leader in the area of privacy protection. Despite difficulties with
the right to privacy and the privacy torts, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970[37] and the Privacy Act of
1974 [38] "provided comprehensive privacy protection for records held by the federal government." [39]
There seemed to be a national trend developing through policymaking and legislation that viewed privacy as
a concept upon which to craft our statutes, rather than as an end unto itself.
{14}In the "mid-1980's the growth of the Internet and new communications services were apparent." [40]
There was an explosion of the use of desktop computers and electronic mail. Questions about the appropriate
standards for government searches and seizures were arising. [41] In response to these questions, Congress
amended Title III and enacted the Electronic Communications Act. [42] These congressional measures
extended existing privacy protections to the realm of electronic communications.
{15}But the U.S.'s leadership role has slipped away. The U.S. is now "viewed by many as falling behind in
the effort to protect this critical right." [43] Today, we are "not only behind the curve in developing sensible
privacy policies to respond to public concerns, we have left the law enforcement community and the
marketing industry to determine how much privacy there will be in the future." [44] The end result is not
surprising. There is growing public concern about the loss of privacy in addition to a widening gap between
the problem we face and the solutions that we should pursue. [45] Simply stated, our current policy is
backward in its approach. We impose government controls on techniques to protect privacy, where market-
based solutions are preferable. Yet, we continue to leave privacy problems to the market, where government
involvement is required." [46] Still, we cannot escape the realty that "privacy is one of the most discussed,
and the most confused, subjects in the online world." [47] However the issues of privacy and technological
advances entwined with market and governmental controls is not a new development by any means:
From the end of the nineteenth century on … the development of widespread communication
through newsprint, the growth of mass transportation, and the inventions of the telephone and
radio made informal methods of privacy protection both insufficient and ineffective.[48]
There are a great many authors who offer differing views on the issue of privacy and its protection in our
various communication modes. For example, Bovenzi views privacy as "a subjective matter, the bounds of
which depend on social norms that can change."[49] Boevnezi speculates that, "in a world that fosters the
application of new technologies to unusual activities and transactions, the introduction of new concepts of
privacy, adapted to protect new interests, may render the new forms of communication less intrusive and
more acceptable." [50]
{16}Diedre Mulligan, Staff Counsel for the Center for Democratic Technology espouses another view in her
regard of privacy as a mechanism that will evolve to "keep pace with changes in technology…[and suggects
that] [t]his requires a periodic assessment of whether changes in technology pose new threats to privacy that
must be addressed through changes in law." [51] Mulligan has a traditional view of privacy. To her, privacy
protects those things that have been defined down through the years as well as the personal and informational
rights of citizens. [52]
{17}Westin defines privacy in still a slightly different manner, as the "claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others." [53] Here, the control over the information communicated is integral to
preservation of privacy. Westin also offers a second and different definition of privacy. He states that,
"viewed as in terms of the relation of the individual to social participation, privacy is the voluntary and
temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical or psychological means." [54]
Authors Cavoukian and Tapscott "would take it one step further by including [the conditional] 'if [to the
equation] - if personal information should be collected or gathered in the first place." [55] This pair believes
in the stringent safeguarding of personal information from the onset. Perhaps Cavoukian and Tapscott press
for the most stringent protectionism of the survey of academics mentioned in this article, as they question
why individuals' private information is ever initially collected, let alone disseminated.
{18}Professor Cate does "not suggest that privacy is inherently evil, but rather [,that it] is not inherently
good." [56] Instead, he seems to view the unimpeded "availability of information and [the] free-flow of data"
[57] as the inevitable result - a casualty. Cate states that, to "the current extent that legal protections and
social mores concerning privacy interfere with creating the systems necessary to acquire and to use personal
information, privacy may even conflict with the interest of the persons whose privacy is being protected."
[58] Professor Cate further comments that, "[w]hile privacy is certainly a necessary element of quality life in
modern society, protecting the privacy of information imposes real costs on individuals and institutions." [59]
{19}Author Steven Miller also views the public's concern in regard to privacy as being overblown. For
example, in his book on how policy should civilize cyberspace, Miller remarks that he "feel[s] that the
public's concern for privacy is like the River Platte, a mile wide but only an inch deep." [60] James Castelli
similarly proposed his views on how to handle personal information in his recent publication about civilizing
cyberspace. In one instance, Castelli comments: "the public's concerns are fueled by a steady supply of
articles and televised programs about the dire implications of data-driven marketing." [61] He points a finger
of blame at the media for creating much of this resulting frenzy.
{20}Solveig Singleton adopts a similar stance of skepticism towards what he views as an ill-equipped
movement to regulate private sector privacy. Singleton also supports the notion that the public's concern for
loss of privacy lacks a substantial foundation in provable reality. [62] He states that the public views the
collection of information in databases and the erosion of privacy "as a serious threat only because advanced
technologies let us wander about the world in new, automated ways, and we realize that the collection of
information has become mechanized as well. It is a mistake to view the collection as morally shocking simply
because we have never noticed that it goes on." [63] Clearly, Singleton is impatient with the Internet
neophytes who are too quick to panic about the vast nature of the web's audience and its broad scope of
coverage solely because the information first appears overwhelming to them due to their own inexperience.
C. Privacy in Our Electronic Society
{21}It is inevitable that personal privacy will be one of the most significant pressure points in our national
fabric for most of the 1990's. Advancing technology depersonalization of the workplace and other social
environments, a growing population can be expected to create a greater personal need for a sense of space
and dignity. [64]
{22}The Web is in the midst of a phenomenal period of growth and innovation. Fathered by Timothy
Berners-Lee, it made its public appearance in 1992. [65] Today, the Web "is now used by more than one-
quarter of the U.S. population, making it the fastest-growing medium in human history." [66] Other
technologies have taken much longer to capture such a comparably large market share. For instance,
television took thirteen years, radio took thirty-eight years, and cable television took ten years to capture their
respective comparable audience bases. [67] The Internet Domain Survey released in January 1998 indicates
that the Web continues to grow at a dramatic rate. The statistics are mind-boggling. There were 29.7 million
hosts in January 1998, up from twenty-six million hosts in July 1997. This statistic can be compared to 1.3
million hosts in 1993. [68]
{23}Regardless of how privacy is defined, it appears that the Web has stretched and contorted the concept.
Cyberspace has done this through being more than a one-dimensional entity. It is analogous to many familiar
real-life metaphors, not just to one. [69] For example, cyberspace has been analogized with the following
objects, places, and entities:
newspapers;
republishers/disseminators;
common carriers (i.e., telephones);
traditional bulletin boards;
broadcasters;
desks at the office;
desks at home in the den;
free and open frontier (a.k.a., The Old West);
safe deposit boxes in a bank;
hotel/motel rooms which one has rented; and
fraternity/sorority houses [70]
{24}The definitions of the Web are as broad as the entity itself. Some scholars are already referring to
computer networks as "the printing press of the Twenty-first Century." [71] But, Loundy argues that computer
network "services are more like common carriers (e.g., more like the Telephone Company than like
publishers)." [72] However, Loundy's argument, which is similar to a number of other scholars, presupposes
that cyberspace is comparable to something that already exists.[73]
{25}The nature of computer systems will vary greatly depending upon the ultimate legal definition of online
computer networks. If an online computer system is like any or all of the items listed above, how do we
legally and ethically deal with this multifaceted, multidimensional environment? Further, how do we deal
with a situation in which two antithetical metaphors seem appropriate?
{26}Problems in applying a legal metaphor have arisen, most notably, in the 1994 LaMacchia case. [74] The
case involved an allegation that the defendant, an MIT student, committed fraud by establishing a computer
system at MIT, supposedly for pirated software trafficking. Unfortunately, "the question of whether the
defendant had in fact committed any crime at all turned out to be a difficult [question] for authorities to
answer." LaMacchia. [75] Defendant David LaMacchia's attorney, Harvey A. Silverglate, stated, "[t]he
government attempts to assert control over this burgeoning thing called the Internet [from time to time]...
[and] spasmodically overreacts in order to set an example, to deter behavior the government doesn't like,"
[76] which then leads to a misapplication of the law.
{27}Instead, the Internet raises many privacy issues that seem to be novel. Yet, in reality, these issues may
not be really novel; instead they may simply challenge our understanding of certain already familiar
metaphors. For example, there are many search engines that will find information anywhere on the Internet,
and store the identity of the person who searched for that information. Given this reality of search engines
and the Internet, should this information be saved knowing that it can be disclosed, sold, or used for
marketing purposes? While this seems to present a clear and present danger for privacy, Marc Rothenberg,
the director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center views such activity as less threatening. Rothenberg
states the following premise: "virtually all privacy law and policy is based on the belief that when individuals
give up personally-identifiable information to organizations, the organizations take on some obligation[,] and
the individuals are granted some rights." [77] Rothenberg envisions an exchange of rights and responsibilities
that is mutually beneficial to service providers or suppliers and customers or end-users. These issues address
the very nature of a computer network and cause confusion in regard to these issues. For example, "[l]iability
for illegal activities in cyberspace is affected by how the particular computer information service is viewed."
[78] If a computer system allows one entity to deliver messages to a large number of users, then the system
may be viewed as a publisher. Many publishers are utilizing computer networks to supplement or publish
editions of their product. [79] In Cubby v. Compuserve, the position of Compuserve was that as an Internet
Service Provider, they were analogous to a library, bookstore, or newsstand. [80] With similar circumstances
at issue in the Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy , Prodigy was analogized to a publisher with the same content
responsibilities as a newspaper. The difference between Compuserve and Prodigy as providers can be
explained by the different analogies that each used to describe the nature of their specific operations. [81]
One commentator summarized the legal community's shock at the holdings of those landmark cases in the
following manner:
It is correct that risk-averse lawyers who had no faith in, or understanding of, jurisprudential
processes were panicky about Stratton Oakmont. That Stratton Oakmont's outcome was
nonsensical was apparent to most readers of the case who knew the holding in Cubby; I think the
reason Stratton Oakmont was taken so seriously in some circles was that too many Washington
lawyers are in the habit of reading headnotes instead of cases." [82]
{28}The lack of understanding as to the nature of online computer networks is also seen at the state level. In
a 1995 symposium on cyberspace law, panelist Frank Easterbrook noted, "[e]rror in legislation is common,
and never more so than when technology is galloping forward." [83] Easterbrook comically likened
cyberspace to a horse for that very reason. In New York, for example, the state legislature has considered the
passage of telecommunications legislation that seems to ignore even the most fundamental constitutional
issues. [84]
{29}In addition to the gaps being created by this new online electronic technology, a legal and ethical
blurring is also occurring due to the lack of consensus among the various stakeholders, as to which legal
metaphors should apply. [85] This discord causes a legal and ethical blurring due to the lack of stakeholder
consensus as to the application of appropriate rules and metaphors. [86]
In the long run, the adoption of information technologies will blur the boundaries between
citizen and agency and between agency and court. [The B]lurring of these boundaries may
necessitate rethinking the definitions of some of the basic events that define the administrative
process, public participation and judicial review. [87]
{30}A clarification of privacy as a global principle for computers, a principle for individual systems, a non-
existent principle, or as some combination of these options needs to be established before other concerns are
then addressed. By deciding upon this classification, society will facilitate the process of developing a basis
of thought upon which other issues (e.g., computer as a newspaper, office desk, common carrier, broadcaster,
etc.) will later rely. Establishing the basic notions of public and private in regard to online computer systems
is critical in order to build a foundation upon which the resolution of other issues will be based. The
relationship of these decisions and analyses demands attention to one level of inquiry before subsequent
levels can be addressed adequately and successfully.
{31}Two points of view appear to exist concerning the broad notion of privacy. On one hand, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation ("EFF") and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility ("CPSR") favor an
almost exclusive form of privacy from governmental intrusion. On the other hand, the system administrators
want to be able to ensure the security and integrity of their online systems. The administrators of online
networks, such as system administrators, postmasters, system operators, want and deserve the legal ability to
protect their systems from vandalism and illegal intrusion, as well as to prevent them from acting as conduits
for pirated software, or from serving as homes for illegal activity. There is legitimate concern that, given free
rein, those who craft policy will follow a path that may not consider the rights of the individual users.
{32}Unlike other constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly defined the right to privacy.
The Court and Congress avoided a straight tackle of the issue of privacy rights when they "defined and
shaped the right to privacy according to the public's reactions to changes in the society." [88] Thus, the
definition that emerges for privacy is amorphous, fluid, implicit, and somewhat ambiguous. The fact that
legislative actions have been reactive, instead of proactive, has compounded the difficulty of anchoring any
lucid privacy rights firmly into our society. Many scholars perceive that the judicial and legislative avoidance
to squarely confront adjudication, legislation, and regulation of privacy in the context of today's technology
has become destructive and must be addressed: "detailed examination of some of the privacy invasion issues
in the rapidly changing telecommunication technology will demonstrate that the right to privacy cannot
continue to be defined by a capricious approach." [89]
{33}Clearly, the notion of privacy is not what it once was. Yet, it is not now what it will need to be in the
future. A paradigm shift is needed - due in large measure, to the staggering advance of technology. This
paradigm shift must either be based upon technology as not only a mechanical entity, but also as an organic
entity - one that serves as a commonly-shared resource for the common good. 
 
III. REVISING OUR CONCEPT OF PRIVACY - STEPPING FORWARD
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and institutions. But laws and institutions must
go hand-in-hand with the progress of the human mind. And that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions
change, with change in circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the
times. [90]
{34}Thirteenth Century emperor Fredrick II proclaimed that legal instruments were not valid if they were
written on paper instead of on parchment. [91] In spite of resistance from the legal community, "paper was
eventually deemed to be dignified enough to replace parchment in legal use." [92] "Centuries later,
typewriters made handwritten documents obsolete." [93] The continuum of change advanced further when,
"time and again technologically new ways of conducting business encounter initial resistance, but ultimately
are embraced by the common law." [94]
A. Evolving a New Perspective on Privacy
To ensure individual privacy, existing laws, practices and policies must be examined and adapted
to the new environment.[95]
{35}Traditional information practices that were "developed in the age of paper records..., must be adapted to
this new environment where information and communications are sent and received over networks on which
users have very different capabilities, objectives[,] and perspectives." [96] New principles and paradigms of
thought must acknowledge that all facets of our society share responsibility "for ensuring the fair treatment of
individuals in the use of personal information, whether in paper or electronic information. The principles
should recognize that the interactive nature of the Internet would empower individuals to participate in
protecting information about them." [97] This approach to conceptualizing privacy is unique and progressive,
in that it recognizes the empowerment provided by greater technological capabilities, rather than fearing the
impacts of the Web's reach. With an educated and enlightened approach to regulation and policymaking for
an entity as novel as the Internet, society has the ability to achieve a "win-win" balance. We can achieve a
mutually-beneficial equilibrium of regulation and policy that restricts abuses of privacy only as much as
necessary, while simultaneously enabling progress at a continued fast pace with minimal regulatory and
legislative intrusion.
We have the technological means at our disposal to provide essentially any desirable balance
between the conflicting extremes of offering privacy to one group[,] while retaining the right to
tap the information transactions of another group. [98]
{36}What remains to be decided is a matter, not based upon the technology alone, but based upon a
balancing of social and technical issues.
Law is a process that is oriented around working with information. As new modes of working
with information emerge, the law cannot be expected to function or to be viewed in the same
manner as it was in an era in which print was the primary communications medium. Nor can the
law be expected to support the same symbols and metaphors. Not only the seamless web, but
"fine print," "black letter law," "law on the books," "going by the book," and other print based
expressions will be replaced by allusions that are more consistent with the qualities of law and
information in electronic form. [99]
{37}Protecting privacy will be one of the greatest challenges for the Internet. To address those challenges, we
should revisit the notion of privacy with the intent of viewing it - not as a definable entity - but as a mission.
Where once, privacy was a clearly-definable entity, it is no longer such. We cannot continue to accept the
ever-expanding and ever-blurring definition of privacy. Today, privacy is an overarching principle that defines
many varied torts, many varied wrongs, and many types of rights. Privacy must be recognized in this changed
role and applied to situations based upon the facts, and not upon what is merely technologically possible.
B. Privacy is More of a Concept Than A Formalistic Definition
{38}One approach to the law of privacy is to ponder the question of 'what privacy actually is, and to what
extent it is protected by law.' This raises questions about our desire for privacy, "why it is that although they
want it they do not make claims for legal protection, and, if they do, why the law is reluctant to respond."
[100] Another approach is to attempt to understand and to formulate a definition of privacy from the legal
decisions or moral institutions that address this issue. [101] But, the dilemma of crafting a single or even
multiple definitions of privacy becomes a Herculean task that necessarily yields a vague and overly broad
definition It would appear that defining "privacy," while, albeit a noble and necessary activity, is much the
same as if we were to attempt to set a single definition to codify "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
In our society, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are goals - concepts, if you will - that the founding
fathers built upon and that we have expanded, interpreted, and continued to evolve throughout the years. So
too, "privacy" is a concept that must remain vague and overly broad so as to allow the flexibility to expand
and to contract existing categories of law in order to accommodate the needs of an ever-evolving society. The
law seems never to "protect privacy, per se, as is indicated by the fact that whenever a remedy for invasion of
privacy is given, there is another interest such as property or reputation [or trespass] that is invaded as well."
[102] The crimes of murder and unlawful imprisonment are violations of our right to life and liberty.
However, violations of these rights are not addressed as infringements of the concepts of "life" and "liberty."
Instead, they are addressed by the application of specifically-defined statutes. So, "privacy" must be viewed
as a "concept" that applies to torts, and that has already been defined. Likewise, privacy applies to access-to-
personal-information issues. Thus, statutes must be created and our thinking must be adjusted to realize that
notion.
{39}We are continually challenged "to define [and even redefine] 'privacy.' Of course, the constitutional
jurisprudence involving the 'right to privacy,' the 'right to be let alone' evolved in lines substantially different
from[those] that set forth in...Prosser['s famous] Torts [treatise] although the [F]ourth [A]mendment concepts
of 'reasonable expectation of privacy' were eventually imported into civil actions as threshold measures of
liability." [103] Where once the issue of "privacy" was primarily one having to do with one's physical
seclusion, one's personal domain, and one's physical withdrawal from society's gaze, it has now come to
include access to information about one's self. [104]
{40}The principles of privacy, in general, must encompass the fundamental notions defined by Professor
Prosser, but must also focus primarily on the responsibility of organizations that collect personal information,
and thereby, control, restrict, or affect access to personal information. The following principles merit our
detailed consideration if we are to effectively address privacy regulation:
The privacy implications of new network services should be made fully known to the
public;
The principle should set out clear rights for individuals whose personal information is
collected;
Enforcement of the principles will require legal rights; [and]
The sale of personal data should require informed consent, possibly even financial
compensation. [105]
Other issues that must be addressed in order to evolve coherent privacy statutes include the following:
Viewing cyberspace not just a mechanical entity but as a commonly shared resource--as a
town common once was viewed;
Establishing the concept and define what a reasonable expectation of privacy is in
cyberspace;
Creating a national privacy agency; [and]
Balancing of benefits when creating statutes that impact privacy. [106]
 
IV. CONCLUSION
{41}Technology has again brought us to a critical juncture. We must now look at what technology has made
possible, rather than simply at the legal principles that underlie these advances. We tend to misapply legal
metaphors due to a lack of conceptual understanding of privacy itself, as well as of modern day technology.
[107] A number of critical issues must be addressed in order to move technology and society forward in
tandem. Understanding the foundational concept of privacy is paramount in such a paradigm shift.
{42}Technology is merely another variable to add to the equation, and should not be viewed as an
insurmountable stumbling block. Just as Warren and Brandeis advocated change in the paradigm surrounding
privacy in their 1890 law journal article, today we should also reassess "our metaphors, customs, [and] rules"
to account for that which can intrude on our basic right to be let alone and not intruded upon. And, in this day
in age, our right to have our personal data kept private must be ensured. We must accomplish this from a
paradigm that has already been developed, by revisiting the conceptual foundations of privacy in light of
cyberspace. [108]
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